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Abstract—We investigate the physical layer security of wire-
less single-input single-output orthogonal-division multiplexing
(OFDM) when a transmitter, which we refer to as Alice, sends
her information to a receiver, which we refer to as Bob, in the
presence of an eavesdropping node, Eve. To prevent information
leakage, Alice sends an artificial-noise (AN) signal superimposed
over her information signal. We investigate the impact of the
channel delay spread, OFDM cyclic prefix, information/AN power
allocation, and information and AN precoders design on the
achievable average secrecy rate. We consider the two cases
of known and unknown channel state information (CSI) at
Alice. Furthermore, we compare both cases of per-sub-channel
processing and joint sub-channels processing at Eve’s receiver.
Our numerical results show the gains of AN injection in terms of
average secrecy rate for different OFDM operating conditions.
Moreover, based on our new insights, we demonstrate that the
AN-aided scheme is effective and achieves almost the same
average secrecy rate as the full-CSI case without the need for
Eve’s instantaneous CSI at Alice.
Index Terms—OFDM, artificial noise, security, wiretap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
Information transmitted over the wireless channel is vul-
nerable to eavesdropping due to the broadcast nature of the
wireless medium. A wireless node with an off-the-shelf radio
module can send/receive data as well as freely listen to other
communications within radio range. This is a critical issue
since an eavesdropping node can analyze the identity of the
transmitting terminals. In addition, an eavesdropping node can
obtain important information regarding the activity and data
shared between the legitimate nodes. Security has been always
maintained through encryption algorithms deployed over the
upper layers of the protocol stack. However, such algorithms
assume limited computation power at the eavesdropping node.
The secrecy of communications between two legitimate parties
in an information-theoretic sense, known as the physical-layer
(PHY) security, was first investigated in the seminal work of
Wyner [1]. The system’s PHY security is measured by the
secrecy capacity of the link connecting the legitimate parties,
which represents the maximum rate of the legitimate parties
with zero information leakage at the eavesdropping node. PHY
security approaches exploit the randomness of the channel in
securing the data between the communicating nodes. This is
achievable by sacrificing a portion of Bob’s transmission rate
in order to confuse nearby eavesdroppers [2].
Investigating the security of OFDM-based systems is cru-
cial since most of the wired and wireless communication
systems adopt OFDM modulation/demodulation. The secrecy
capacity of OFDM-based systems were derived in [3]. To
simplify the system’s design, the authors of [4] defined the
This work is supported by Hyundai Inc.
system’s security using a lower-bound on the minimum mean
squared error between the transmitted and decoded data at the
eavesdropper. By modeling the OFDM wiretap channel as a
special instance of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channel, the authors of [5] derived its secrecy rates
for asymptotically high and low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
regimes.
To further confuse the eavesdroppers, linear precoding for
PHY security was proposed in, e.g., [6]–[11] and the ref-
erences therein. For example, in [8], the authors proposed
power-allocation schemes for precoding transmissions aided
with artificial noise (AN). Reference [9] investigated temporal-
AN injection scheme for the single-input single-output single-
antenna eavesdropper (SISOSE) OFDM system. The temporal
degrees of freedom provided by adding the cyclic-prefix
sequence is exploited to transmit a precoded time-domain
AN vector which is added to the information vector before
transmission. A direct extension of the problem presented
to the MIMO case was proposed in [10]. In [11], the au-
thors investigated the impact of a hybrid spatial-temporal
AN scheme on the security of MIMOME-OFDM systems.
In [12], a secure scheme for combining temporal AN with
secret key extraction is proposed. Different from the above-
mentioned works, we investigate the properties of temporal
AN and analyze its dependency on the channel matrices which
follow a circulant structure. Then, we exploit these properties
to design precoding and power allocation strategies for the case
when Eve’s instantaneous channel state information (CSI) is
available at Alice and the case when Alice does not know
Eve’s channel. Our main contributions in this paper are as
follows
• We exploit the temporal degrees of freedom provided by
the cyclic prefix (CP) sequence added to each OFDM
symbol to inject AN vectors that hurt the illegitimate
receivers (i.e., Eves). We investigate the temporal AN
scheme and study the precoders’ designs at Alice that
can increase the average secrecy rate.
• We study the power allocation for data and AN signals
under known and unknown Eve’s instantaneous CSI at
Alice. We analyze and break down the AN-precoding
problem into two AN precoders. The first precoding
matrix cancels the AN at the legitimate receiver, Bob,
while the second precoding matrix, assuming known
Eve’s instantaneous CSI at Alice, focuses the AN signal
in the directions of the Alice-Eve channel vectors. Then,
we show that, with an appropriate design of the first
precoder, the second precoder can be eliminated which
reduces the design complexity. Moreover, we show that
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there is a useful number of directions that can be used
to confuse Eve (i.e., degrade her data rate) which is a
function of the delay spread duration of both the Alice-
Bob and Alice-Eve channels.
• We derive a tight approximation on the instantaneous
secrecy rate for the case of equal-power allocation and
show that, at high input SNR, the average secrecy rate
is a linear function of Alice’s transmit power level (in
dB). Hence, unlike the case of no AN injection where
the instantaneous secrecy rate becomes independent of
the transmit power level, in our investigated AN injec-
tion scheme, increasing Alice’s transmit power can still
increase the instantaneous secrecy rate. Moreover, the
achievable average secrecy rate is a linear function of
the number of useful AN streams.
• Unlike [9], we investigate the best decoding strategy at
Eve, where Eve jointly decodes the OFDM sub-channels
simultaneously using the maximum likelihood (ML) de-
coder, and we derive its instantaneous secrecy rates. Then,
we compare it with the per sub-carrier processing strategy
and show that Eve’s data rate significantly decreases
when she uses per sub-channel processing as in [9]. This
fact demonstrates that for Eve to achieve the highest
possible rate, she needs to adopt the complicated ML
decoder whose complexity increases exponentially with
the number of OFDM sub-channels.
• We propose a new transmit power allocation scheme
which significantly reduces the complexity of the subopti-
mal scheme proposed in [9]. Our scheme achieves a com-
parable performance as the suboptimal iterative scheme
proposed in the literature with much lower complexity
and we derive closed-form expressions for the used power
levels.
Notation: Lower- and upper-case bold letters denote vectors
and matrices, respectively. IN and F denote, respectively, the
identity matrix whose size is N × N and the fast Fourier
transform (FFT) matrix. CM×N denotes the set of all complex
matrices of size M × N . (·) and (·)∗ denote transpose and
Hermitian (i.e., complex-conjugate transpose) operations, re-
spectively. |·| cardinality of a set. RM×N denotes the set of real
matrices of size M × N . E{·} denotes statistical expectation.
[A]k,1:N is the k-th row of the matrix A ∈ CM×N . 0M×N
denotes the all-zero matrix with size M×N . diag = {·} denotes
a diagonal matrix with the enclosed elements as its diagonal
elements. [·]+ = max{0, ·} returns the maximum between the
argument and zero.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND TEMPORAL AN DESIGN
In this section, we state our main assumptions and then
explain the design of the proposed AN-aided scheme.
A. System Model and Assumptions
Consider a wiretap communication scenario consisting of a
single transmitter (Alice) who wishes to send a confidential
information to a legitimate receiver which we refer to as Bob,
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). All three nodes
are equipped with single antennas. Alice transmits her data
using OFDM with N sub-channels. The CP of size Ncp is
added in time domain at the transmitter using the CP insertion
matrix, denoted by Tcp =
[
ENcp×N IN
]
∈ R(N+Ncp)×N ,
and is removed at the receiver using the CP removal ma-
trix, denoted by Rcp =
[
0N×NcpIN
] ∈ RN×(N+Ncp), where
E =
[
0Ncp×(N−Ncp) INcp
]
. The CP is used to eliminate the
inter-block interference and should be longer than the channel
delay spreads. Let LB and LE denote the channel memories
of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links, respectively. We assume
that the channel coefficients of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links
remain constant during the coherence time and change from
one coherence time to another. Each tap of the channel impulse
response (CIR) of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links has
average gain of σ2A−B and σ2A−E, respectively. The CP is
designed to be longer than the channel memory of both the
Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links. Let nB and nE denote the zero
mean circularly-symmetric complex-additive Gaussian white
noise (AWGN) at Bob and Eve, respectively. Let κB and
κE denote the noise variances of Bob and Eve, respectively.
Hence, for a per sub-channel bandwidth of Δf , the noise
power per sub-channel at Bob and Eve are ΔfκB and ΔfκE,
respectively.
Let Htime ∈ C(N+Ncp)×(N+Ncp) and Gtime ∈
C(N+Ncp)×(N+Ncp) denote the complex time-domain Toeplitz
channel matrices of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links,
respectively. Moreover, H = FRcpHtimeTcpF∗ ∈ CN×N
and G = FRcpGtimeTcpF∗ ∈ CN×N denote the
corresponding frequency-domain complex diagonal channel
coefficients of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links, respectively.
Px = diag(px1 , px2 , · · · , pxN ) is a diagonal power matrix
containing the transmit power levels at each sub-channel,
and x denotes the N × 1 independent data symbols with zero
mean and unit variance. The N × 1 received signals at Bob
and Eve are given respectively by,
yB = HP
1
2
x x+ nB, and yE = GP
1
2
x x+ nE (1)
B. Temporal AN Design
The temporal AN enhances the PHY security by sacrificing
a portion of Alice’s data power to transmit AN signals to
degrade Eve’s SNR. The AN is injected in the time domain
to exploit the temporal degrees of freedom provided by the
CP [9]. Without loss of optimality, we assume that the AN
precoding is composed of two matrices. The first matrix,
Q ∈ C(N+Ncp)×Ncp , designs the AN to span the null space
of the channel matrix between Alice and Bob as follows
RcpHtimeQ = 0 (2)
The second precoding matrix, U ∈ CNcp×Ns , correlates the AN
streams and steers them to maximize the interference power
at Eve. Given that Q has Ncp orthonormal basis vectors, we
can send a maximum of Ncp AN streams. Let z ∼ CN (0,Σz)
denote the Ns × 1 AN symbols transmitted to confuse Eve
with Ns ≤ Ncp streams and Σz denote the AN diagonal
covariance matrix. The received signals at Bob and Eve can
be, respectively, expressed as
yB = HP
1
2
x x+ nB (3)
yE = GP
1
2
x x+ FR
cpGtimeQUz+ nE (4)
Proposition 1. Let Lu denote the maximum of the channel memories
of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links (i.e., Lu = max(LB, LE)).
There are (Ncp − Lu) useless AN directions that project the AN
signals in the null space of Alice-Eve channel, and Ns = Lu useful
AN directions that can degrade Alice-Eve’s instantaneous link rate.
Proof. Alice superimposes the temporal AN symbols on the data
signal in the time domain after CP insertion. The composite signal
is received at Bob after it passes through the equivalent Alice-
Bob channel in the time domain which is expressed as RcpHtime,
where Rcp =
[
0N×NcpIN
]
and Htime is lower-triangular Toeplitz
channel matrix with [htime(0), htime(1), . . . , htime(LB), 0, . . . , 0]
as its first column where htime(i) is the i-th tap of the Alice-Bob
link CIR. Hence, RcpHtime can be expressed as
RcpHtime =
[
0N×(Ncp−LB) H
′
N×(N+LB)
]
(5)
where H
′ ∈ CN×N is the equivalent Alice-Bob channel matrix
after CP removal which is an upper-triangular Toeplitz matrix with
[htime(LB), h
time(LB − 1), . . . , htime(0), 0 . . . , 0] as its first row.
The null space precoder (Q) contains the orthonormal null space
basis vectors of the equivalent Alice-Bob channel matrix which can
be expressed as
Q = Null (RcpHtime) = Null
([
0N×(Ncp−LB) H
′
N×(N+LB)
])
.
(6)
RcpHtime has Ncp − LB zero columns. Selecting any of these all-
zero columns has to be part of the orthonormal basis of the Alice-Bob
channel matrix null space which is given by
Q = Null (RcpHtime) =
[
W(N+Ncp)×(Ncp−LB) Q
′
(N+Ncp)×LB
]
(7)
where W = [INcp−LB 0(N+LB)×(Ncp−LB)]
 and Q
′
= Null (H
′
)
contains the LB columns of Bob’s null space that arise from the
different combinations of Bob’s channel coefficients.
At Eve, the received AN across the N data OFDM sub-channels
after the FFT can be expressed as
iN×1 = Q˜z (8)
where Q˜ = FRcpGtimeQ of size N×Ncp represents the equivalent
channel matrix experienced by the temporal AN before it reaches Eve.
Eve’s time-domain channel after CP removal is given by
RcpGtime =
[
0N×(Ncp−LE) G
′
N×(N+LE)
]
(9)
Hence, the AN vector across the data OFDM sub-channels of Eve
can be expressed as
iN×1 = FN×N
[
0N×(Ncp−LE) G
′
N×(N+LE)
]
×
[
W(N+Ncp)×(Ncp−LB) Q
′
(N+Ncp)×LB
]
zNcp×1
(10)
where G
′
represents the non-zero columns of the equivalent time-
domain Alice-Eve channel matrix after CP removal which has a form
similar toH
′
. The number of zero columns that project AN on the CP
of Eve is equal to min(Ncp−LB, Ncp−LE) = Ncp−max(LB, LE).
Hence, the equivalent AN at Eve is given by
iN×1=FN×N[0N×(Ncp−Lu) U
′
useful N×Lu ] zNcp×1 (11)
where U
′
useful =
[
0N×(Ncp−LE) G
′
N×(N+LE)
]
Q
′
, and Lu =
max (LB, LE). From Equation (11), we can deduce that Q˜ has rank
Lu. Furthermore, we conclude that the first Ncp − Lu AN streams
of zNcp×1 are useless and do not impact Eve’s performance since
they are multiplied by all-zero columns. These useless streams inject
AN only on the CP of Eve which will be removed anyway by the
receiver before processing the data streams. The useful streams are
the Lu AN streams multiplied by U
′
useful. Hence, the number of
useful AN streams is equal to the maximum of Alice-Bob and Alice-
Eve channel memories. As LB increases, the number of non-zero
orthonormal basis vectors of Bob’s null space increases. Therefore,
the number of useful AN streams increases. As LE increases, Eve’s
channel spreads each AN stream across more of its data sub-channels.
Hence, the number of useful streams is Lu = max(LB, LE).
In the following subsections, we analyze the two cases
where Eve’s instantaneous CSI is known or unknown at Alice
which affect the design of the second precoder matrix, U.
C. Eve’s Instantaneous CSI is Known at Alice
In this subsection, we exploit the availability of Eve’s
instantaneous CSI at Alice to design a second precoder (U)
to maximize the interference at Eve and extract the Lu useful
streams. Alice-Eve’s instantaneous link rate can be expressed
as
RE = log2 det
(
IN +GPxG
∗
(
Q˜UΣzU
∗Q˜∗ +ΔfκEIN
)−1)
(12)
From Proposition 1, Q˜ has rank Lu. Hence, it has Lu non-zero
singular values and Ncp−Lu zero singular values. Considering
the singular value decomposition (SVD) Q˜ = RzΛzV∗z , Alice-
Eve’s instantaneous rate is given by
RE = log2 det (IN +PxGG
∗
× (RzΛzV∗zUΣzU∗VzΛ∗zR∗z +ΔfκEIN )−1
) (13)
To maximize the interference power at Eve, we concentrate
all AN power on the useful Lu streams. We use Ns = Ncp
and assign zero power to the useless directions. We design U
such that U∗Vz = INcp and steer the AN to the right singular
vectors of Eve’s channel matrix that correspond to the non-
zero singular values. Doing so, we extract the Lu useful AN
streams, and Alice-Eve’s link instantaneous rate is given by
RE = log2 det
(
IN +PxGG
∗ (RzΛzΣzΛ
∗
zR
∗
z +ΔfκEIN )
−1
)
.
(14)
The instantaneous rate of the Alice-Bob link is given by
RB =
N∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
|Hk|2px,k
ΔfκB
)
(15)
where Hk is the channel coefficient at OFDM sub-channel k.
We emphasize here that the Alice-Bob channel matrix is diag-
onal and the noise is AWGN and, hence, the per sub-channel
processing at Bob is optimal. On the contrary, the temporal
AN couples the sub-channels at Eve’s receivers. Hence, she
needs to perform the joint sub-channels processing/decoding to
achieve the highest possible data rate in (14). The instantaneous
secrecy rate of the legitimate system is given by
Rsec = [RB −RE]+ (16)
The power allocation problem is formulated to maximize Rsec
subject to a total power constraint as follows
max:
Px, Σz
N∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
|Hk|2px,k
ΔfκB
)
−log2 det
(
IN +PxGG
∗ (RzΛzΣzΛ
∗
zR
∗
z+ΔfκEIN )
−1
)
(17)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
px,i +
Lu∑
i=1
pz,i = P (a)
px,i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} (b)
pz,i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lu} (c)
where pz,i are the diagonal elements of the diagonal covariance
matrix Σz corresponding to the non-zero singular values, and
P denotes the total power of data and AN. Problem (17) is
non-convex in the optimization variables (px,i, pz,i). Hence, we
propose a suboptimal two stage approach, where in the first
stage, we obtain the power allocation for the AN streams and
in the second stage, the power assignments to the data sub-
channels are computed.
In the first stage, we treat the AN symbols as data symbols
that should be received at Eve under the rate-maximization
problem. In other words, the AN power allocation problem is
formulated as follows
max:
pz,i
log2 det(IN +RzΛzΣzΛ
∗
zR
∗
z), s.t.
Lu∑
i=1
pz,i = (1− α)P
(18)
where α is the fraction of power allocated to data and (1−α)
is the power fraction dedicated to AN. By using Sylvester’s
identity, Problem (18) can be reformulated as follows
max:
pz,i
Lu∑
i=1
log2(1 + δ
2
z,ipz,i), s.t.
Lu∑
i=1
pz,i = (1− α)P (19)
where δz,i denotes the i-th diagonal element of the diagonal
matrix Λz. Problem (19) is a convex optimization problem and
can be solved using the well-known water filling approach as
follows
pz,i =
[
C1 − 1
δ2z,i
]+
∀ i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , Lu (20)
where C1 is a constant and can be obtained as follows
C1 =
(1− α)P
Lu
+
1
Lu
Lu∑
k=1
1
δ2z,i
(21)
After obtaining the power allocation for the AN symbols,
in the second stage, the data power allocation can be obtained
from [9], [13] as follows
pi =
⎧⎨⎩ 12ξi
(√
γ2i − 4ξi μ+|G˜i|
2−|Hi|2
μ
− γi
)
, |Hi|2 − |G˜i|2>μ
0, otherwise
(22)
where γi = |Hi|2 + |G˜i|2, ξi = |Hi|2|G˜i|2, |G˜i|2 =
|Gi|2
ΔfκE+q
∗
i UΣzU
∗qi , qi represents the i-th row of Q˜, and μ denotes
the Lagrangian multiplier which can be obtained form the total
power constraint
∑N
i pi = αP .
D. Eve’s CSI is Unknown at Alice
When Alice does not know the coefficients of Alice-Eve’s
channel (represented here by U
′
useful), she can not use a second
precoder (U). In this case, the instantaneous Alice-Eve’s link
rate can be expressed as follows,
RE = log2 det
(
IN +GPxG
∗
(
Q˜ΣzQ˜
∗ +ΔfκEIN
)−1)
(23)
However, Alice can still extract the Lu useful streams that can
actually harm Eve with only the knowledge of Alice-Eve’s
channel memory (LE). This can be achieved by designing the
null space precoder as in Equation (7) while the AN covariance
matrix is designed as follows
Σz = diag(0, 0, · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ncp-Lu terms
, pz, pz, · · · , pz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lu terms
) (24)
By substituting with Equations (7) and (24) into Eve’s instan-
taneous rate in (23), we can notice that no power is allocated to
the useless AN streams. Equal power allocation is performed
across the useful AN streams since Alice does not know
which streams cause more harm to Eve. The power of each
AN stream is given by pz = (1−α)PLu . Without Eve’s channel
knowledge, the data power is allocated only based on the CSI
of the Alice-Bob link. The data power allocation problem can
be formulated as follows
max :
px,k
N∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
px,k|Hk|2
ΔfκB
)
, s.t.
N∑
k=1
px,k = αP (25)
Problem (27) is the well-known water filling problem where
the optimal power allocation strategy is given by
px,k =
[
C − ΔfκB|Hk|2
]+
, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} (26)
where C is a constant given by
C =
αP
N
+
1
N
N∑
k=1
ΔfκB
|Hk|2 (27)
An approximation that we found to be very tight is to
replace the unitary matrix Rz in Eve’s instantaneous rate with
the identity matrix. In this case, the instantaneous rate of the
Alice-Eve link is given by
RE≈ log2 det
(
IN + pxGG
∗V−1
)
(28)
where V = (ΛzΣzΛ∗z +ΔfκEIN ). This can be rewritten as the
sum of two terms as follows
RE≈
Lu∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
|Gi|2px
σ2i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AWGN+AN
+
N∑
i=Lu+1
log2
(
1 +
|Gi|2px
ΔfκE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AWGN only
(29)
where σ2i = ΔfκE + (1 − α) PLu δ2z,i. This approximation
suggests that the effect of temporal AN is equivalent to
interfering on only Lu of Eve’s OFDM sub-channels. Hence,
the instantaneous secrecy rate can be given by
Rsec≈
[
N∑
i=1
log2
(
1+
|Hi|2px
ΔfκB
)
− RE
]+
(30)
We conclude this section by illustrating the tightness of our
approximation of Eve’s rate in Fig. 1, which shows the average
Eve’s and Bob’s rates and the average secrecy rate versus α.
As shown in Fig. 1 and suggested analytically by Preposition
2 the average secrecy rate becomes independent of 0 < α < 1
at high input SNR.
Proposition 2. At very high input SNR, the average secrecy
rate is lower bounded as follows
E
{
[RB −RE]+
}
 Lu log2
(
P
NΔfκB
)
(31)
Proof. The proof is omitted here due to space limitations.
E. Per Sub-channel Processing at Eve
Under per sub-channel processing, Eve decodes each
OFDM sub-channel individually. Hence, the received signal
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Fig. 1: Average rates and secrecy rate versus α.
at Eve per sub-channel k is given by
yE,k = Gk
√
px,kxk + [FR
cpGtimeQU]k,1:Nsz+ nE,k (32)
where yE,k is the k-th element of yE, [FRcpGtimeQU]k,1:Ns
is the k-th row of FRcpGtimeQU, the power of the AN across
the k-th data sub-channel is ηk = [diag{RzΛzΣzΛ∗zR∗z}]k =∑Lu
i=1 |ri,k|2δ2z,ipz,i with ri = [ri,1, ri,2, · · · , ri,N ] as the i-th
row of R∗, and nE,k is the k-th element of nE. The achievable
rate at Eve under per sub-channel processing is given by
RE=
N∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
|Gi|2px,i
ηi +ΔfκE
)
(33)
In this case, all Eve’s OFDM data sub-channels will be
degraded by the AN signal which degrades Eve’s instantaneous
rate significantly. The achievable secrecy rate is thus given by
Rsec=
[
N∑
i=1
log2
(
1+
|Hi|2px,i
ΔfκB
)
−
N∑
i=1
log2
(
1+
|Gi|2px,i
ηi+ΔfκE
)]+
(34)
In contrast, the joint sub-channels processing exploits the
AN correlation across the data sub-channels to minimize the
interference effect to be equivalent to interference on Lu sub-
channels only as shown in (29).
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we evaluate the average secrecy rate of
the system for different system’s parameters. We consider
a bandwidth (B) of one MHz and we plot the rates in
bits/sec. Thus, we multiply all rate-expressions by BN+Ncp to
convert the rate unit from bits/OFDM block to bits/sec. The
channel taps of Bob and Eve are uniformly distributed with
a total unity channel power. We assume that Bob and Eve
have unit noise power (i.e. ΔfκE = ΔfκB = 1 dBm) and
the power per sub-channel is given by Ps = P/N . Fig. 2
depicts the average secrecy rates versus the number of OFDM
sub-channels, N , when Eve performs the conventional (low-
complexity) per sub-channel decoding and when she performs
the computationally-prohibitive joint sub-channels decoding
approaches. For the joint sub-channels decoding approach, Eve
can exploit the interference correlation across the data OFDM
sub-channels, due to the injected temporal AN signal, and
reduce its effect. We assume that equal power allocation is
performed across all sub-channels. We notice that the average
secrecy rate is reduced significantly when Eve performs joint
OFDM sub-channels decoding and this reduction increases
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Fig. 2: Comparison between the average secrecy rate perfor-
mance of per sub-channel decoding and joint OFDM sub-
channels decoding at Eve.
with N . As N increases, the AN correlation across the
data OFDM sub-channels increases and Eve can exploit such
correlation to enhance her ability to decode the information.
In all the following results, we assume the worst-case scenario
for Alice and Bob where Eve performs joint sub-channels
decoding.
Figs. 3 and 4 depict the average secrecy rate for different
power-allocation algorithms at input SNR=30 dB and SNR=10
dB per sub-channel, respectively. By increasing Ncp, we
increase the number of orthonormal null space vectors of
the channel matrix of the Alice-Bob link. Hence, Alice can
send more AN streams. However, as per Proposition 1, the
number of useful AN streams only depends on the channel
memories of the legitimate and eavesdropping links. Increasing
Ncp while Lu is fixed only increases the number of useless
AN streams which does not degrade Eve’s channel. However,
as Ncp increases, the average secrecy rate decreases due to
the pre-log term
(
1
N+Ncp
)
in the rate expressions. Since the
equal-power allocation scheme is unable to extract the useful
AN streams, it has the lowest average secrecy rate. When
Eve’s instantaneous CSI is unknown at Alice, we can extract
the useful AN streams using the properties of the null space
precoder and allocate the power based on CSI of the Alice-
Bob link only. The performance in this case outperforms the
performance of using a second precoder with equal-power
allocation. If Alice knows Eve’s instantaneous CSI, she can
perform the power allocation based on the per-sub-channel
instantaneous secrecy rate as in (22) with a second precoder
or using the null space precoder only. Both techniques have
very close performance. The results are also compared with
a high-complexity iterative optimization over CVX that has
been proposed in [9] and similar performance is achieved with
our low-complexity closed-form based scheme proposed in
Section II-C. Hence, there is no need for the second precoder
(i.e., precoding matrix U) if we extracted the useful AN
streams using the well-designed first precoder (i.e., precoding
matrix Q) which reduces the complexity significantly.
Fig. 5 shows the average secrecy rate versus LB for a fixed
LE = 8. As expected, the variation in the average secrecy rate
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Fig. 3: Average secrecy rate for different power-allocation
algorithms at SNR=30 dB as we vary Ncp.
is very small as LB ≤ 8. However, for LB > 8, the average
secrecy rate increases significantly as LB increases. Similarly,
we can plot a figure for the average secrecy rate versus LE
which shows similar behavior as in Fig. 5. The (average)
secrecy rate depends mainly on max(LB, LE). Moreover Fig.
5 shows that the loss in performance, due the unavailability of
Eve’s CSI, is not significant since we are able to extract the
useful AN streams in both scenarios.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the PHY security of temporal AN-aided
OFDM-based wiretap communications. The main conclusions
of this paper are summarized as follows
• We showed that although the null space dimension of the
Alice-Bob channel matrix is Ncp, the number of useful
directions that can hurt Eve is only max{LB, LE} due to
the structures of Bob and Eve channel matrices after CP
insertion in OFDM transmissions.
• We showed that a single null-space-based AN precoder
(i.e., the first precoder) is sufficient and there is no
need for a second precoder and, hence, the complexity
will be reduced and there is no need to acquire Eve’s
instantaneous CSI at Alice.
• We show that, when Eve adopts per sub-channel process-
ing, her rate will be significantly degraded due to the fact
that the AN will be spread over all OFDM sub-channels.
In contrast, if Eve adopts the joint OFDM sub-channels
processing, the AN will affect only Lu sub-channels.
Hence, Eve’s instantaneous rate will be much higher than
the rate with per sub-channel processing.
• We showed that our new proposed suboptimal power
allocation scheme under full CSI at Alice can achieve a
comparable average secrecy rate as those in the literature,
but with much lower complexity and we derived closed-
form expressions for data and AN power levels.
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